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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue presented is whether the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on 
an alleged improper execution of a search warrant, in light of 
the application of a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
DANNY DUANE BUCK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19772 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Danny Duane Buck, was charged with two 
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute for value, a felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1979). 
Defendant was convicted of both counts, in a bench 
trial held December 6, 1983, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Banks on February 10, 1984, to the Utah State Prison for 0-5 
years and fined $250 on Count I and to the Utah State Prison for 
0-10 years and fined $250 on Count II, the sentences to run 
concurrently. Judge Banks granted a stay of the sentences and 
placed defendant on probation with the following conditions: 
1) defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County Jail; 
2) defendant pay a fine of $500; 3) defendant enter and complete 
a halfway house program with work release; and 4) defendant 
comply with the usual drug-related conditions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 18, 1983, Stephen Brown, an officer with the 
Metropolitan Narcotics Strike Force, requested a "no-knock" 
search warrant from the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office to 
search defendant's residence (R. 162-63). Officer Brown's 
request was supported by information obtained from a reliable 
confidential informant who had purchased marijuana and 
amphetamines from defendant and had observed approximately one-
half pound of marijuana and a large quantity of amphetamines at 
defendant's residence (R. 54). Pursuant to Officer Brown's 
request, Richard McKelvie, a deputy county attorney, prepared the 
search warrant and the search warrant affidavit, specifically 
including facts in the section of the affidavit form reserved for 
no-knock search warrants (R. 53-56, 65-66, 163, 184-85). .£>££ 
also Addendum for copy of affidavit and search warrant. 
Once prepared, Officer Brown read the documents, but 
failed to notice the discrepancy between the affidavit 
(requesting a "no-knock" provision) and the search warrant 
(failure to authorize a "no-knock" execution) (R. 53-56, 65, 
186). Officer Brown paid particular attention to the affidavit 
and the address on the search warrant, but glossed over the other 
provisions of the search warrant (R. 206) . Later that same day, 
Officer Brown presented the search warrant and affidavit to Judge 
Eleanor Lewis, Fifth Circuit Court (R. 163-64). He swore under 
oath to the facts contained in the affidavit and Judge Lewis 
signed both documents (R. 53-56, 65-66, 163-64). After Judge 
Lewis signed the search warrant, Officer Brown believed he had 
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authorization to execute a no-knock search warrant at defendant's 
residence (R. 164). 
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 19, 1983, Officer 
Brown led a search team and executed the search warrant at 
defendant's residence without announcing their purpose or 
authority (R. 164). At the time the warrant was executed, 
neither the defendant nor anyone else was in the residence (R. 
164). The subsequent search uncovered approximately one and one-
quarter (1 1/4) pounds of marijuana, about 800 amphetamines, and 
a set of scales commonly used by drug dealers (R. 173, 175-78). 
At approximately 5:10 p.m., the defendant returned to 
his residence and was placed under arrest (R. 165). Defendant 
was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1979) (R. 12-
13). The preliminary hearing on this matter was held on May 18, 
1983 before Judge Eleanor Lewis. It was then that Officer Brown 
was first made aware that through a clerical or administrative 
error, the appropriate box on the search warrant authorizing a 
no-knock warrant had not been checked (R. 65, 206). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence. The mere technical violation was not 
"substantial" and Officer Brown reasonably believed he was acting 
lawfully when he executed the search warrant in a "no-knock" 
fashion. Therefore, this case falls within the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule recently established by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
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hBSUMEL 
JOINT I 
OFFICER BROWN OBTAINED THE SEARCH WARRANT 
PURSUANT TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
AND EXECUTED IT IN GOOD FAITH, THEREFORE, 
A MINOR TECHNICAL VIOLATION SHOULD NOT 
JUSTIFY SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED. 
Defendant's grounds for suppression of the evidence is 
based on an alleged improper execution of a constitutionally 
valid search warrant. Defendant claims that because Judge Lewis 
signed a search warrant which did not include authorization for a 
"no-knock" provision, she intentionally denied Officer Brown's 
request for a no-knock warrant. This inference is very 
questionable in light of the fact that Judge Lewis not only 
signed the warranty but she also signed the affidavit which 
specifically requested a no-knock warrant. It is at least as 
conceivable, if not more sof that Judge Lewis thought she was 
authorizing a no-knock warrant consistent with the request in the 
affidavit. If Judge Lewis intended to deny Officer Brown's 
request for a no-knock warrant, it is probable that she would 
have expressly stated her intention in an effort to avoid a 
misunderstanding. 
Officer Brown's conduct was indicative of a good faith 
effort to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the 
United States Supreme Court's recent articulation of a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule provides a basis for upholding 
the trial court's determination to admit the evidence seized 
during the search. United States v. Leon. U.S. 104 
S.Ct. 3405 (1984). In L^on, the Court stated that, "when law 
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enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their 
transgressions have been minorf the magnitude of the benefit 
conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system," Xd. at 3413. 
Applying an "objective good faith" standard to this 
case, Officer Brown acted to protect defendant's rights by 
submitting the question of probable cause to search defendant's 
residence to a neutral magistrate. Moreover, he carefully read 
the affidavit and swore under oath to the truthfulness of its 
contents. Officer Brown also paid particular attention to the 
address on the search warrant and the object of the search. 
Although he failed to notice that the box authorizing a no-knock 
warrant was not checked. Officer Brown reasonably believed that 
he had authorization to execute the warrant without giving 
notice of his purpose or authority. 
In Massachusetts v. Sheppard. a case applying the 
objective good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
established in Lfijan, the Court held that evidence should not be 
excluded when police officers conducting the search acted in 
objectively reasonably reliance on a facially defective search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. 104 S.Ct. 
3424 (1984). Justice White stated that, "[n]ormally, when an 
officer who has not been involved in the application stage 
receives a warrant, he will read it in order to determine the 
object of the search. In this case . . . , the officer who 
directed the search knew what items were listed in the affidavit 
presented to the judge, and he had good reason to believe that 
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the warrant authorized the seizure of those items*" Xd. at 3429r 
n* 6. 
Applying Justice Whitefs reasoning to the instant case, 
Officer Brown directed the search and knew that the affidavit 
requested a no-knock warrant* He therefore had good reason to 
believe that the warrant authorized the police to proceed with 
the search without giving notice of their purpose or authority. 
Other courts have applied a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in similar cases. In a case involving an 
apparent violation of Rule 41(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (requiring execution of a search warrant 
within ten days of issuance), a federal district court held that 
because the violation was caused by a typographical error and the 
officers acted in good faith, exclusion of the evidence seized 
was not required. In Re Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas, 
593 F.Supp. 184, 192 (D.W.V. 1984). In that case, the United 
States Attorney's Office prepared the warrant and inadvertently 
typed in August 12, 1983 as the date of issuance instead of 
August 22, 1983. id. Thusf there was a technical violation of 
Rule 41(c)(1) when the search warrant was executed on August 23f 
1983, but the court refused to exclude the evidence seized, 
citing h&sm and Sheppard. JjJ. 
Similarly, the alleged violation in the instant case 
was caused by a clerical or administrative error committed by the 
Utah County Attorney's Office in failing to check the box on the 
search warrant authorizing a no-knock warrant. Therefore, 
exclusion of evidence based on a technical violation of the law, 
when the officer acted in good faith, is not justified. 
In United States v. Sager. the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that even though the search warrant was invalid 
because the affidavit contained inaccuracies and did not include 
certain facts necessary to establish probable causef evidence 
seized could not be suppressed because the officers acted in an 
objectively reasonable fashion. 743 F.2d 1261r 1266-67 (8th Cir. 
1984). In SaflfiXf the court refused to suppress evidence seized 
under an unconstitutional search warrant. In the present case, 
the search warrant was constitutionally valid, but was allegedly 
executed in an improper fashion due to a clerical omission when 
the warrant was prepared. 
Furthermore/ defendant was not injured by the failure 
of the officers to give notice. The policy reasons behind 
requiring notice prior to entering a home to execute a search 
warrant were articulated by Justice Brennan in his dissenting 
opinion in Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). He stated that 
"innocent citizens should not suffer shock, fright or 
embarassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion 
. . . " and that notice would reduce the danger to police because 
they might be mistaken for illegal intruders. 374 U.S. at 57-58. 
Therefore, because the house was empty when the search warrant 
was executed, no one suffered shock or embarassment and no one 
was exposed to any risk of harm or danger. 
This Court expressly upheld the constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2), allowing a search without notice in 
State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974). Authorization for a 
no-knock warrant need only be supported by proof that the object 
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of the search may be quickly destroyed. In the instant case, 
Officer Brown met this burden (R. 56, 163). Moreover, "the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United 
Statesf 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Consequently, where no 
interests protected by the notice requirement were violated, 
i.e., where there was a mere technical violation of the letter, 
but not the spirit of the law, exclusion of relevant evidence 
which would ultimately result in dismissal of the case is an 
unduly harsh remedy. 
In a recent decision, this Court held that a search is 
not invalidated because of minor technical deficiencies in the 
warrant's description when supported by an affidavit which 
sufficiently described the area to be searched. State v. 
Anderson, P.2d , (Utah Case No. 18934, decided June 7, 
1985). In applying the Court's reasoning to the present case, 
the search warrant was issued pursuant to an affidavit which 
specifically requested a "no-knock" provision. Furthermore, it 
should be emphasized that the warrant made specific reference to 
the affidavit and the affiant, Officer Brown, executed the search 
warrant. ££& Commonwealth Y. TodiscQr 363 Mass. 445, 294 N.E.2d 
860 (1973). Therefore, the affidavit and the warrant could be 
read together to validate the search. 
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POINT II 
OFFICER BROWN'S BELIEF THAT HE HAD THE 
AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE WARRANT IN A 
NO-KNOCK FASHION WAS REASONABLE AND 
CONSISTENT WITH GUIDELINES ARTICULATED 
BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. 
The United States Supreme Court enumerated four 
situations where suppression of evidence remains an appropriate 
remedy. They are: (1) if the magistrate or judge issuing the 
warrant was misled by information in the affidavit that the 
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for 
his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) if the issuing 
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) if the officer 
relied on a warrant based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause as to render belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable; and (4) if the warrant is "so facially deficient— 
i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the 
things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot 
reasonably presume it to be valid." United States v. Leon, 104 
S.Ct. 3405, 3421-22 (1984). The Court further stated that, 
"other objections to the modification of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule we consider to be insubstantial." Xd. 
When applied to the present case, it is clear that 
there was no evidence of false information in the affidavit which 
misled the judge issuing the warrant, the issuing magistate did 
not abandon her judicial role, and the affidavit supporting the 
warrant was not lacking in indicia of probable cause. The sole 
issue is whether the warrant was so facially deficient that it 
could not be reasonably relied upon by the executing officers. 
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In addressing this issue, courts have held that minor 
errors in the execution of the warrant will not justify 
suppression of relevant evidence. In United States v, Segovia-
Mel garf the court applied Lexm and held that evidence should not 
be suppressed even though the warrant was executed by an 
Immigration and Naturalization Service agent who did not have 
authority to carry out the search. 595 F.Supp. 753, 758 (D.D.C. 
1984). 
In a case where a warrant was executed at night without 
authorization, the Sixth Circuit held that the search occurred 
shortly after the 10:00 p.m. deadline, there was reasonable basis 
for a nighttime search if it had been sought, there was no 
indication that the search would have been less abrasive if 
carried out in the daytime, and there was no evidence of an 
intentional disregard of the law. United States v. Twenty-Two 
Thousand, Two Hundred Eighty-Seven Dollars, United States 
Currency, 709 F.2d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 1983). 
Applying this rationale to the instant case, even if 
the officers had announced their purpose and authority, because 
the house was empty, they would have been justified in entering 
in exactly the same manner that they did. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-10(1) (1980). The search, therefore, was no more 
abrasive than if it had been executed by first giving notice. 
In addition, there were reasonable grounds for a no-knock warrant 
and there was no evidence of an intentional or deliberate 
disregard of the scope of the warrant. 
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The United States Supreme Court, in applying an 
objective good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, held 
that evidence should not be suppressed when the officer had done 
all he could reasonably be expected to do to obtain the warrant 
and that it was reasonable to believe the warrant permitted a 
search consistent with a more precisely drafted affidavit. 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, u.s. ,104 s.ct. 3424, 3429 
(1984). In that case, as in the present case, the officer 
obtained a warrant and executed it without noticing an error in 
the form of the warrant. Because the officers acted in an 
objectively reasonable fashion, it would be unjustified to 
exclude evidence solely to punish non-culpable Fourth Amendment 
violations. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED UNDER 
UTAH LAW BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VIOLATION 
WAS NOT "SUBSTANTIAL11 AND OFFICER BROWN 
ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
The Utah good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
is consistent with the "objective good faith" standard 
established in L&on. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12 (g) (1982) 
provides in pertinent part: 
(g)(1) In any motion concerning the 
admissibility of evidence or the suppression 
of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and 
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall 
not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in 
good faith. The court shall set forth its 
reasons for such finding. . . . 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer 
was acting in good faith under this section, 
the court shall consider, in addition to any 
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other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of the deviation from 
legal search and seizure standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will 
tend to deter future violations of search and 
seizure standards; 
(iii) Whether or not the officer was 
proceeding by way of search warrant, arrest 
warrant, or relying upon previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was 
invaded. (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Legislature has therefore set forth a two-
prong test which must be satisfied before suppression of the 
evidence may properly be ordered by the Court. Under the first 
prongf the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the 
violation was "substantial." A substantial violation is defined 
by § 77-23-12 which provides: 
Pursuant to the standards described 
in section 77-35-12(g) property or 
evidence seized pursuant to a search 
warrant shall not be suppressed at a 
motion, trial or other proceeding unless 
the unlawful conduct of the peace 
officer is shown to be substantial. 
Any unlawful search or seizure shall be 
considered substantial and in bad faith 
if the warrant was obtained with malicious 
purpose and without probable cause or was 
executed maliciously and willfully beyond 
the authority of the warrant or with 
unnecessary severity. 
Officer Brown entered the defendant's residence only 
after procuring a search warrant which he reasonably believed to 
be a no-knock warrant. Judge Lewis found that there was 
sufficient probable cause to support the search warrant. 
Defendant failed to offer any evidence that the search warrant was 
executed "maliciously or willfully" beyond the authority of the 
warrant or with unnecessary severity. Thus, defendant failed to 
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satisfy his statutory burden of proof that the violation was 
substantial, thereby rendering the evidence admissible. 
The State bears the burden of establishing that the 
officer acted in good faith only after the defendant has proved 
that the violation was "substantial." Assuming arguendo that the 
violation was substantial. Officer Brown clearly acted in good 
faith. Under the factors set forth by the statute to be 
considered in determining good faith, the fact that Officer Brown 
acted only after obtaining a search warrant, and requesting a no-
knock warrant, weighs heavily in favor of a good-faith finding. 
Moreover, by submitting the question of probable cause to search 
defendant's residence to a detached and neutral magistrate, 
Officer Brown acted to protect defendant's rights. As previously 
stated, because no one was present at the residence when the 
warrant was executed and because the question of probable cause to 
search was properly decided by a neutral magistrate, the invasion 
of defendant's privacy was minimal. Consequently, where an 
officer went to the trouble of obtaining a search warrant and 
reasonably believed he acted lawfully, suppression of the evidence 
would merely serve to free the criminal based solely on a 
hypertechnical breach of the law rather than to promote the policy 
behind the exclusionary rule of deterring improper police conduct. 
The United States Supreme Court articulated only an 
"objectively reasonable belief" standard to support the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. Utah statutes impose a more 
stringent test to establish good faith and are therefore clearly 
not in violation of the Fourth Amendment as re-defined by L£QH. 
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CONCLUSION 
Officer Brown acted in good faith to protect 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining a warrant from a 
neutral magistrate. He reasonably believed he had authorization 
to execute the warrant in a no-knock fashion consistent with his 
request in the affidavit. The good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule established by the United States Supreme Court 
was intended to prevent suppression of evidence in instances 
precisely like the present case where a minor error has been 
committed and officers have acted in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant which was subsequently determined to 
be defective. 
Furthermore, defendant failed to demonstrate a 
"substantialn violation as defined by Utah law. Thus, suppression 
of relevant evidence crucial to the State's case based upon a mere 
technical violation of the letter, but not the spirit of the law 
is unjustified. 
DATED this day of June, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
//SANDRA L. (£k)$REi 
(
-
/
 Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Ginger L. 
Fletcher, attorney for appellant, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 8411, this day of June, 1985. 
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s u b s t a n c e w i t n i n t e n t t o d i s t r i b u t e . 
/ v r o 
PAGE TWO 
AFFTItVwT F" SZknZtl KtASA*;? 
1 * ),e * u * ' *-L, * orounds for issuance of a Search Warrant ore: 
Affiant, a Salt u.<i . . ,mty Ketro K'aicotics Strike Force Detective, 
Bases this affidavit 'upon the information of a Confidential inferr--
an+. vv'C h?? svrrZi* 3 affiant with the following information: 
3 _. ;.:ri* -jtA, the Confidential in: orr.arjt vent with Affiant 
to the abeve listed address. The Confidential informant entered the 
residence while affiant reme'inec Outside. Prior to entering, the 
Confidential informant was searched by affiant to ascertain he had 
no controlled substances in his possession. Tucn his return.! the 
Confidential informant had in his possession Atphet e:: 5 res . The 
Confidential informant indicated he purchased the Arphetartnrs 
frorr Danny Buck, inside the above listed residence. 
2. 0: i At ru 1 IE, ]SE3, Affiant again went to the =b:ve li^\.ez k-::-
t i on with the confidential informant. The: corficent:al inforrant 
again entered the residence after being searched iy affiant. -e 
acain returned fioxri the residence, this tire in pcsse*£sicn of :~a:-i~ 
juara, which he indicated v;as purchased frorr. Danny ?urh. He :";:::'.=r 
indicated that there was about i/2 pound of r.arijusra in the resid-
ence, as well as a quantity c-f amphetamines. The confidential in-
formant indicates that Danny zuch tc3d hi.in he has 3 ujpes cf rari-
juara en the premises, as veil as ]arce quantities cf arnpheta~ir.es. 
(!::•! 
PAGE THREE 
AfTIOAVit P0K SEARCH VTAR?ANT 
re "liable beccuse {if any i n f D i r i . i o r . i s o t t e r e d frorr an tnnen-~d scarce) 
2 . - f r i a n t u s e d t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a n t en an u n r e l a t e d d r u g 
ms3e on A p r i l 1 3 , IE S 3 . The i n f o r m a t i o n h e s - j p p l i e d p r o v i d e d 
r e 1 i ab 3 e . 
2. A f f i a n t w a s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a b o v e - d e s c r i b e d t .* r n - e c t i c n t o t h e 
e x t e n t t h a t h e s e a r c h e d t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a n t t o d e t e r m i n e 
h e h a d no c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s on h i s p e r s o n , f e t c h e d h im e n t e : 
and t h e n e x i t t h e p r e m i s e s , a n d r e t u r n w i t h c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n m 
Your a f f i a n t hss v e r i f i e d the above in;f c r r a t i o n from "The ccr-f i dent : a l ir. fc.:n.:= 
tc be correct and a c c u r a t e thrc-'j?h the f cl l ov ing independent inves t i est:: on: 
a f f i a n t h a s f i e l d - t e s t e d t h e a m p h e t a m i n e s p u r c h a s e d by t h e 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a n t and h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e v a r e g e n u i n e 
A f f i a n t w i t n e s s e d t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a n t e n t e r t h e a b o v e -
l i s t e d r e s i d e n c e a n d r e t u r n w i t h t h e c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s , 
a f t e r c o n f i r m i n g t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i n f o r m a n t h a d n o c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e s i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n u p o n h i s e n t r y . 
\j r, *. O 
F A S E F 0 U K 
AFFIDAVIT FGF SEARCH WARRANT 
V7HEFZF0RE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items: 
XllX* ^n -—e cay time. 
( ) at any time cay or night be Jere is reason to DSneve it 
is necessary to seize the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for ether c:od reasons, t c 
tfit: 
I eJur! (:f a p p — p r i a t e ) the o f f i c e r 
war ran t n o t be r ecru-i red to give n o t i c e of the o f f i c e r ' s a u t h o r i t y or piu 
because : 
( ) p h y s i c a l harrt may r e s u l t to any per .-or. i f : - o t : : e * - re civr 
XXX t-*"e ]?roz.ert? sought r ay be cruicV.Iy d r : - r . : :v 6 c , c i s t ^ e d of, 
s e : r e * - e c . 
This danger is believed to e>ist b-etause: 
rr.; or 
i or 
easily destroyed on short notice. Affiant believes that th 
ence would be given an opportunity to destroy the evidence 
if starching officers vera to identify themselves-,---end that 
efforts might veil be successful. v^  ^ \ , ' \ 
ceasing 
ant are 
C. • - ^ h 
V«. . — V • A.ND SV.j> K TC K 
STATE OF UTAH 
oi : : :i ; 
C I R C U I T CO\ AT 
IN AND FOr 5-AL.T lATi. CCT1*TY, STATE OF UTAH 
Wo 
CVJVFY OF S.z-1.7 LAVJE, ST;rT£ Or UTAH 
To any r - :oce o f f i c e r i n t h s F e a t e c * V \ a h . 
P r o o f by A f f i d a v i t u n d e r o a t h h a v i n g b e e n r .-de t h i s cay b e f o r e me by 
_ __, I &r s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e r e i s p r - :b=b3e c e u s t 
T h a t • -n t h e p e r s o n {s) of _ _ _ _____ 
In t h e v e h i c l e ( s ) d e s c r i b e d a s 
}?}:]/ en t h e r y — i s e s known a s j ] ^ 5 B._2lL3.rJX en. J r O ' e x o / ^ . „* ._?_• 
_ ..uni t_. ewe31.1 DO , 
I n t h e C i t y o f ^ c - i j - j ^ v ^ __ ___, C : . n : y of 
S t a t e of U t a h , t h e r e i s now b e i v r p c - i s e s s e i o r c o : r € = * 
e v ; der.ee d e s c r i b e d a s : 
* ; u i JL _J •-* —.i i d 
Z ~ *""-*' •=- "*" — V ^ **"•• ~» C 
>" "** - - s _' ."- ~~v* l y a c q u i r e d o r i s ur.lawf u~ l y or : s ; r s e e l . 
::• I-.-:-:, v -d t o 0OiTi.Tiit o r c o n c e a l a p u b l i c c" f ~ r . s e . 
s b - : : c p o s s e s s e d v i t h t h e p u r p o s e t o i s e i t i s a me?_rir o f 
• - . - i t : : no c r c . n c e a l i n g a p u b l i c o f f e n s e . 
> \ > or. ~ : ? . s of an i t e m o r c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e c: : ." ' I . ' . - r l c : : - i o o r f 
•-'Ss.essec r y a p a r t y t o t h e i l l e g a l c o n d u c t . 
( } i s e v i d e n c e of i l l e g a l c o n d u c t i n p o s s e s s i o n of a p e r s o n o r 
e n t i t y n o t a p a r t y t o t h e i l l e g a l c o n d u c t and good c a u s e b e i n g 
shown t h a t t h e s e i z u r e c a n n o t be o b t a i n e d b y s u b p o e n a w i t h o u t 
t h e e v i d e n c e b e i n g c c - n c e a l e d , de = t : o : ~ d , ~ - . r a g e d , o r a l t e r e d . 
( C o n d i t i o n s f o r s e r v i c e of f- i - » r r : c - ' C
 c ; e i n c l u d e d or a t t a c h e d 
h e r e t o . ) 
You a : e t h e r e f . i »i c r: 
ty)jl ^n t h e ^ a Y t i m e 
{ ) a t any t i m e day o r n i g h t (good c a o s e h a v i n g b e e n shown) 
( ) t o e x e c u t e w i t ! iout n o t i c e of a u t h o r i t y o r p u r p o s e , {proof 
under o a t h b e i n g shewn t h a t t h e c : i e : t of t h i s s e a r c h may 
b e q u i c k l y d e s t r o y e d o r d i s p o s e d of c r t h a t harm may r e s u l t 
t o any p e r s o n i f n o t i c e w e r e g i v e r ' ) 
< P / T > 
SEANCE K&RRANT 
t o n a k e a s e a r c h t f t n e =.-'_ve-nar._-d c r d e s r i i i ^ e d o e r s o n { s ) , v e h i c l e l s ) , and 
p r e m i s e s f o r t h e h e r e i n - a S t v e c - r . - r r i b - d j r : ; - _ r t y o r e v i d e n c e and i f you f i n d 
t h e saine o r a n y p a r t t b e r e c f , t c b r i n g i t f o r t h w i t h b e f o r e xrie a t t h e F i f t h . 
Circuit C o u r t , C c r . : y o f S a l t L a k e , S t a t e of U t a h , o r r e t a i n such p r o -
p e r t y i n y o u r o u s t e d ; ? • / - t o t h e o r d e r of t h i s c o u r t . 
GIVEN UNDER V; 
EUIXSE, J'Jp'fcE O ^ C r Z Fr^CS, OR 
C'JJRI 
if ' ll 
